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ABSTRACT

A lack in end-user awareness in computer security issues provides the rationale for this
investigation. The research considers whether or not the provision of an educational
package addressing computer security issues will improve awareness and transform
behaviour of end-users in assessing and enacting appropriate responses in computer
security situations.
A group of twenty participants was studied in detail using a mixed methods research
approach. The participants were drawn from a cross section of computer end-users,
from elementary to advanced levels of computer literacy.

Outcomes include a positive response to the provision of material, however human ·
factors were found to be equally important in affecting the way the end-users assess and
react in computer security environments. Package interactivity, empowerment for endusers to prioritise and make their own assessments was found to be critical factors.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Since the Internet's creation, there has been a dramatic change in the way people live
and work. Computers and the Internet are used for financial transactions, banking,
storing highly sensitive information and a range of other activities. These activities, in a
non-computing context, would require a high level of security. The environments from
which many users operate from home and work contain many possible security flaws
and exploits introduced by users. An attacker, if willing, may employ a wide array of
techniques to take advantage of this extensive range of exploits.

This investigation's aim is to discover whether improving end-users' knowledge of
relevant exploits and how they are taken advantage of will produce safer behaviour and
implementation of computer security countermeasures. It is argued that if computer
users can be empowered with this knowledge they will change their behaviour,
providing a safer operating environment. Greer (1977, p. 9) states that "the task of
education is to change behaviour", this investigation will assess whether or not the provision of an educational package addressing computer security issues, could be
shown to change end-users behaviour.

1.1 Rationale
Humans are frequently referred to as computer security's 'weak link' (AusCERT, 2004;
Wade, 2004; Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2003). Wade (2004) states, "all too often it is the
people aspect that breaks down" (p. 1). Figures from AusCERT (2004) show that annual
losses for computer crime or computer misuse or abuse, increased by 20% compared to
2003 (p.3). For all organisations surveyed the most common problem in reaching an
effective information security solution was changing end-user's k..'1mvledge and
attitudes.

"With the rapid and widespread propagation of today' s worms and viruses,
technology solutions are, by themselves, inadequate. Organisations need to asses
the vulnerability of their system software, features and configurations, and
increase user awareness and education." (AusCERT, 2004, p. 18)
AusCERT (2004), states that "since the last Australian Computer Crime and Security
Survey, AusCERT 1 has seen a steady increase in the number, and sophistication of
scamming techniques directed against users of online banking and electronic banking
1

AusCERT- Australian Computer Emergency Response Team
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sites" (p. 24). This provides justification for an investigation concerning to what extent
(if any), end-users can be empowered with knowledge on possible attacks and exploits
(and how to prevent them), and whether or not this will provide a safer operating
environment.

1.2 Research Question

The research question driving the investigation is:

"Would the provision of an educational package addressing computer security
issues change end-users' behaviour and use and implementation of computer
security systems?"
Addressing this question provides an insight into the behavioural effect of increasing
users' knowledge.

1.3 Investigation Design

The investigation was conducted using an explanatory approach to mixed method
research as defined by Cresswell (2003). An educational package, in the form of an
easily understood presentation aimed at the end-user who has a minimum amount of
computer literacy, will be developed. The presentation explains, in basic terms, how
intruders may gain access to computer systems, malicious software and techniques that
may be employed to make computing safer. Participants complete an initial
questionnaire outlining demographic information along with their perceived
understanding of computer security issues. After presenting the package to twenty
participants, data concerning the end-user's willingness to use more secure systems are
collected and analysed, Three questionnaires are presented to participants following the
package presentation; one initially and two after a two week period. The first two
questionnaires gather quantitative data concerning participants' perceived change in
awareness and behaviour. This is followed by a qualitatively based questionnaire
outlining their perceptions of the package. It is proposed that this qualitative data will
provide insight into details such as how understandable package was, how comfortable
the subject felt and how they felt the presentation could have been improved.

7

1.4 Scope

The sample population for the investigation contains twenty participants from the
Bunbury area. The population demographics include any person, of any age, who use
computers either for personal computing or work related tasks. Data on the participants'
responses who are not actively involved in computing is not relevant to this
investigation. This investigation will not include wireless networks or wireless security
issues. The research will explore the various definitions of hackers and crackers, from
these definitions a standard definition for this paper will be identified and used.

1.5 Overview of Document

The following section provides a view of the investigation's background. The literature
review examines existing knowledge in the fields of human involvement in computing,
computer crime, computer security and education. The explanatory approach to mixed
method research, as the adopted methodology, is then discussed in chapter four
accompanied by a justification for its selection. The investigation design and ·
implementation is presented in chapter five providing a view of how the investigation
was performed. A summary of results, adapted from the investigation feedback is
presented in chapter six. Chapter seven analyses these results providing a discussion on
the effectiveness of the study. Chapter eight draws conclusions from the study and
summarises the investigation, also, an outline of recommended future work is provided.
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2.0 BACKGROUND
Computers are used in hospitals, businesses, banks and households. They are often used
to store important and sensitive data. A lack in computer security in any of the above
areas has the potential to disclose information such as patient records, trading policies
and client data for businesses, credit card information and account details in banking
and personal information in home computing. This list, adapted from Capron and
Johnson (2003, p. 7), outlines the relevant principal areas where computers are currently
used.

•

Law Enforcement - Computers in law enforcement are used to store national
fingerprint files, nation wide files describing the mode of serial killers,
computer modelling of DNA and DNA databases which can be used to
match hair, blood and other evidence, offender records, sex offender records,
court proceedings, witness locations and other highly sensitive information.

•

Money - Computers are widely employed in banking as well as online banking. The use of computers in this field speeds up record keeping,
allowing banks to offer same day services. "Computers have helped to fuel
the cashless economy, enabling the widespread use of credit cards and
instantaneous credit checks by banks and retailers" (Capron and Johnson,
2003, p. 7).

•

Government - Taxes, social security issues, immigration databases are
among the uses of computers in government.

•

Home - Computers in peoples homes are used for Internet banking,
purchasing products online, keeping records, preparing budgets and range of
other social, economic and recreational activities.

•

Health and Medicine - "Computers help to monitor the seriously ill in
intensive care units and provide cross-sectional views of the body" (Capron
-and Johnson, 2003, p. 7). In addition to this computers are used to store
patient records, diagnosis information, prescription details

As shown, computers used in these areas, come into contact with and contain highly
sensitive data. For example, criminal records and court proceedings in law enforcement,
financial details in money, patient information in health and medicine and personal
details in home computers. Computers containing such information are typically
secured using network equipment. However, Ernst and Young (2004) state the
9

following: "No amount of technology can reduce the human dimension" (p. 3). Humans
however, when using these services introduce a range of security vulnerabilities and
threats.

Outside of computing, the physical security surrounding banks is extremely high.
Cameras monitor the bank, money is stored in a vault, and clients must provide
sufficient identification before making transactions. Regarding Internet banking, the
connection from a home computer to the bank, may appear to be highly secure.
However, if the home computer is compromised, then all information entered into the
computer (credit card details, passwords and personal identification numbers) is
available to an attacker. Computers may become comprised by an end-user failing to
take simple precautions, such as using a secure password, checking the authenticity of
emails and not installing erroneous software.

The identification of poor user awareness and poor security culture has been identified, .
however, this has not spurred changes to educate users and improve security culture
(AusCERT, 2005):
Inadequate staff training in computer security management (47%) and poor
security culture within organisation (40%) were among the top vulnerabilities
reported. This compares to 61% of respondents who identified changing users'
(staff) attitudes and behaviour towards computer security practices a challenge
for them. (p. 4)
This extract demonstrates the contrast between organisations acknowledging user
awareness and security culture is a problem and their willingness to deal with it. In
addition only 61% of respondents identified changing these attitudes as a challenge. The
survey found that 79% of respondents stated their organisation should " ... do more to
ensure an appropriate level ofiT security qualification" (AusCERT, 2005, p. 12).

Threats to computer users are constantly changing and evolving. Evidence of evolution
is apparent in the establishment of a new Internet based scam. Phising targets computer
users directly through a socially engineered form requesting personal information. This
information usually allows the attacker access to some form of online service such as
banking. Riley and Spencer (2005) state "the perpetrators of the phising scams set up a
simple con, usually in the form of an email, to lure the victim into surrendering private
information". The information may be credit card numbers, personal identification
10

numbers, account numbers, passwords to systerhs or an entire range of personal details.
Riley & Spencer (2005) assert "Trend said the phising scams were usually easy to spot,
but succeeded because people failed to take the necessary precautions". This quote
highlights, once more, the important of user awareness and education.

A justifiable need exists for organisations to increase computer security awareness
among employees. The CSIIFBI underlines that, "for some time, it has been widely
recognized that computer security is as much a management problem as it is a
technology problem" (p. 4). Despite this however, the following was reported in a 2005
study directed by AusCERT: "only 7% of respondent organisations reported they were
managing all computer security issues reasonably well (compared to 5% in 2004 and
11% in 2003 and 2002)" (p. 1). With computer security companies estimating two
thousand malicious threats are emerging every month (McAfee, 2005, p. 5), computer
users and businesses are faced with an increasing need to do improve computer security.
User awareness and behaviour has been clearly established as the main barrier in.
achieving effective computer security. Greer (1977) states, "the task of education is to
change behaviour" (p. 9). It is therefore a natural conclusion that an appropriate step
towards an effective computer security solution is the development of an educational
package designed to educate and inform end-users.

11

3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review examines and discusses the role and impact of humans in
computing, computer crime, computer security and effective adult education. Each
section is of critical importance to the investigation. This literature review explores how
the human factor impacts on computing, what current threats exist, how these threats
may be mitigated or prevented and how the end-users should be educated.

3.1 Computer Users
Dix, Finlay, Abowd and Beale (1998) note humans' importance in computing, "the
human, the user, is, after all, the one whom computer systems are designed to assist" (p.
12). Bishop (2003), states that "the heart of any security system is people" (p. 21).
However, Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003) elaborate that "people are the weak link in any
security system ... " (p. 596). This emphasises that while people are at the core of any
security system, they also represent the weakest link in that system. Pfleeger and
Pfleeger (2003) present the following reasons behind the introduction of weaknesses by people in security, "whether through carelessness, poor understanding, pressure, or
simple human error, insiders unintentionally expose private data" (p. 596). Wade (2004)
supports this notion, he states that:

All too often it is the people aspect that breaks down. Whether it is naivete,
ignorance or simply a lack of training, more and more employees are
unwittingly opening a gateway in their company networks to any number of
unauthorized users. (p. 1)
This view is endorsed by Ernst & Young (2004) who surveyed 1, 233 organisations
from 51 countries and duly discovered that a "lack of employee awareness" was listed
as the top obstacle in providing an effective computer security solution. Out ofthe 1,233
organisations surveyed, "less than half the respondents provided their employees with
ongoing training in security and controls" (Ernst & Young, 2004, p. ii). This survey
shows that despite the obvious importance of the human factor in computing security,
companies are not paying enough attention to user training and awareness programs.
AusCERT (2004) supports this stating that the most common difficulty for organisation
was "changing user attitudes and behaviour (reported by 65 percent of respondents)"
(p. 3). AusCERT further reveals that the total losses for only 57% of the respondent
organisations were 16 million dollars, with an average loss of 116, 212 dollars per
organisation.
12

AusCERT (2005, p. 30) provides a graphical representation of which vulnerabilities
contributed to an attack on surveyed organisations over a twelve month period.
Respondents were asked: "In terms of your organisation's potential vulnerabilities, what
factor may have contributed to those attacks which harmed the confidentiality, integrity
or availability of your network data or systems in the past twelve months?" (AusCERT,
2005, p. 30). AusCERT (2005) reveals that "inadequate levels of security on home and
other computers used by clients, customers and staff' (p. 30) was listed by 26% of
respondents in 2005 as contributing to attacks. AusCERT (2005, p. 30) found that
"inadequate staff training and education in security practices and procedures" was listed
by 47% of respondents as contributing to these attacks. In addition to this "poor security
culture in organisation" (AusCERT, 2005, p. 30) was considered by 40% of
organisations as contributing to attacks. For 2005, these factors represent three of the
top four vulnerabilities listed by organisations.

Ware (2003) states, "in terms of security policy, companies are doing the 'blocking and
tackling' technique and covering user behaviour, employee awareness and network and
system administration issues" (p. 1). However CSI/FBI (2004) show that "on average,
respondents from all sectors-except the high-tech sector and the federal governmentdo not believe that their organization invests enough in security awareness" (p. 4). This
highlights the difference in views between organisations. Peltier (2004) reiterate the
need for employee awareness in stating "employees must be educated, or made aware,
that they will be expected to protect information" (p. 345).

The above establishes the notion that user awareness is a critical factor in computer
security and that educating end-users on computer security issues will improve security.
The need for strong computer security established the growing threats to computer
systems a.I!d end-users.

3.2 Computer Crime
This .section focuses on the main threats posed to computer users. These threats are:
cracking, fraud, social engineering, denial of service attacks, malicious software and
password crackers. Each threat falls under the heading of 'computer crime' which is
defined by Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003) as "any crime involving a computer or aided by
the use· of one" (p. 20). Accurately quantifying the total financial loss due to computer
13

crime remains a very difficult task. However according to McAfee (2005, p.2), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates the overall financial loss is close to 400
billion dollars.
3.2.1 Hackers and Crackers

It is important that an initial distinction is made between hackers and crackers. It is
beyond the investigation's scope to argue either way; however, a clear distinction will
be made. Jewkes (2002) argues that "the 'true hacker' would claim that pointless
vandalism within computing is the work of crackers (usually defined as criminally
motivated cyber-trespassers) not hackers" (p. 131 ). This view is supported by
Schwartau (2000), who states that "crackers are criminal Hackers. Since so much
hacking is truly useful to the infom1ation industry as a whole, it's difficult to label
hackers as 'bad"' (p. 41). Schwartau (2000) continues to explain that "hacking does
cross into blatantly illegal behaviour,, which the US (and other countries) has strictly
defined" (p. 41). The following are two important American laws outlined by Schwartau
(2000) that constitute criminal behaviour in computing, thus distinguishing a hacker
from a cracker.

1. If you possess passwords to a computer network that you do not have
permission to use, you have broken a US federal law and perhaps many
others.
2. If you actually enter a computer system without permission, even if there a
re no security controls or password blocking mechanisms, you have also
committed a felony (p. 41).

This suggests that simply gaining unauthorised access to a computer system is illegal,
and therefore the work of a cracker. Anonymous (2003) defines a hacker as "a person
intensely interested in the arcane and recondite workings of any computer operating
system"

cP.

47). Anonymous (2003) continues to explain that hackers would never

intentionally damage data, continuously seek knowledge and always share freely their
knowledge. The author contrasts this definition with that of a computer cracker, he
states, "a cracker is one who breaks into or otherwise violates the system integrity of
remote machines with malicious intent" (p. 47). Unauthorised access, destroying vital
data and otherwise causing problems are all distinguishing features of a cracker.
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This section establishes the difference concerning hackers and crackers as malicious
intent and/or actions (cracker), as opposed to the quest for knowledge and technical
enlightenment (hacker). For the purposes of this document reference to individuals who
gain unauthorised entry into any computer system will be achieved using the term
'attacker'.

3.2.2 Hacking
In this section the concept of hacking is addressed, for the purposes of this section the
concept will be examined in relation to gaining unauthorised access to a computer
system from a remote location. It is beyond the scope of this section to make a
distinction between hackers and crackers as this has been addressed in a previous
section (section 3.2.1). For the purposes ofthis section hacking refers to gaining entry to
a computer system from a geographically remote location, whether or not it is condoned
as illegal activity or not is irrelevant, this section will explore the basic mechanisms
used to do so, and the information required.

Anonymous (2003) provides a basic description of hacking and the methods employed
by hackers. One aim of this investigation is to present basic information to a group of
computer users with little computer literacy, therefore, content from this source will
serve as a guide to what information should be presented to participants. Anonymous
(2003, p. 97) presents an introduction to hacking. He begins with an introduction to
TCP/IP and an explanation of how it works. Following this, network and application
level protocols are described including a view of ports. This description is adapted for
the purposes of this literature review in order to focus on information relevant to the
investigation.

Anonymous (2003) describes the Internet Protocol address (hereafter IP address) as" ...
a unique identifier for a system on the network" (p. 106). The author continues to
describe IP addresses as being 32 bits long, containing 4 numbers, each a byte,
separated by decimal points: for example 32.96.111.130. The workings ofTCP/IP are
outside the scope of this investigation as it is deemed too advanced for users with little
computer literacy (whom the investigation is aimed at) Anonymous (2003) describes
that connections to computers are "made using a system of ports" (p. 111).
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3.2.3 Fraud
According to Lekakis (2005) Internet fraud is costing the National Australia Bank one
million dollars per month. He continues to explain that this could blow out to thirty
million dollars by the end of the year (article published in July) and the overall cost of
Internet fraud to Australian banks could be as high as seventy million dollars per year.
Jewkes (2002) presents many scams and exploits that occur on the Internet. These
exploits are often aimed at users who are not educated about the risks of computing.
Jewkes (2002) covers issues such as identity theft, cyber-stalking, cyber-society, and
various other activities.
"The Internet provides unparalleled opportunities for those seeking a new
identity to access the necessary information ... Detailed information regarding
individuals may be available on personal or workspace websites as well as via
professional organisations of which the individual is a member." (Jewkes, 2002,
p. 94)
Jewkes (2002) explains "businesses have responded to the growth of the Internet by
offering online services that provide impostors with the opportunity to engage in
fraudulent conduct 'at arms length"' (p. 95). Jewkes (2002, p. 95) provides further
insight into this increase in crime by explaining that online businesses provide a sense
of anonymity that increases the chance of individuals engaging in fraudulent activities
when they would otherwise not risk it in person. Poei (2005), states that in the past five
years, Internet fraud has cost consumers five billion dollars.

3.2.4 Social Engineering
Bishop (2003) presents the concept that computer security deals predominately with
security controls that can be bypassed by human intervention (p. 21). Social engineering
exploits the human factor in computer security in order to trick users into disclosing
information, usually authentication details such as usernames and passwords. An
example of a social engineering attack is an attacker making a phone call to a highly
~

situated person in a company (such as a vice president), claiming to be an employee of
the company who needs his/her username and password for a highly important situation
(Bishop, 2003, p. 21). Once the person, who believes the request, discloses their
usemame and password the attacker has access to the system without having to bypass
any technical counter measures such as firewalls. Schwartau (2000) avows that you
should "never give out personal information on the phone to people you don't know.
Telephone solicitation is a great criminal scam. Be especially cautious about cellular
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phones" (p. 100). Schwartau (2000) covers hackers, phreakers, identity theft, and
Internet terrorists. The publication presents a large number of social engineering
techniques and real life instances where they have been used. Many of these instances
are unconfirmed and unofficial, however they present a possible reality and are
therefore are important to consider in terms of possible attacks.

While socially engineered telephone calls present a threat to computer security, socially
engineered emails are responsible for countless security breaches. These emails also
represent a growth sector in online threats. Socially engineered emails are being used to
coerce users into disclosing personal details regarding financial services via phising.
McAfee (2005) defines phising as using spoof e-mails or directing people to fake Web
sites to fool them into divulging personal financial details so criminals can access their
accounts (p.19). Lepofsky (2004) supports this definition in stating that "phishing scams
involve fooling consumers into givirig their personal data to thieves masquerading as
legitimate banks, credit card companies and other e-commerce operations" (p. 1) ..
According to Symantec (2005) the number of phising threats has grown from an
average of 3 million per day to around 5.7 million in the six months prior to September
2005. McAfee (2005) assert phising email complaints now make up more than half of
the 15,000 complaints filed monthly to the FBI's Internet crime center (p. 14). This
underlines the financial implications of socially engineered threats and the extent to
which they exist.

3.2.5 Denial ofService Attacks
A Denial of Service (hereafter DoS) attack is an attack that intentionally disrupts or
denies a service or function to legitimate computer users, computer networks or
computer systems (Anonymous, 2003; McClure, Scambray & Kurtz, 2001). McClure,
Scambray and Kurtz (2001) describe aDoS attack as a threat causing system downtime,
lost revem1e, and labour increases for tasks such as identifying and recovering from the
attack. The following list, adapted from Anonymous (2003, p. 298) explains three ways
in which DoS attacks work.

1. Bandwidth Consumption - An attack against network resources. Aimed at
making the network slow or stop this attack causes the inability of users to
access web sites, email and any files stored on the network.
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2. Resource Saturation - Every computer system has a finite set of resources,
these include memory, storage, and processor capabilities. This attack involves
using up one or all of these resources and is aimed at making the system
unusable.

3. System and Application Crash- These attacks exploit a pre-existing program
flaw that, when triggered, cause a system or application crash.

This underlines the mechanisms behind DoS attacks. When combined with malicious
motives DoS attacks present a serious threat to end-users and organisations. Another
threat to end-users is malicious software. With the exception of insider abuse of system
resources and laptop theft, malicious software represents the most common form of
attack and is responsible for the greatest financial loss for organisations (AusCERT,
2005, p. 17).

3.2. 6 Malicious Software
Allen (2001) and Noakes-Fry (2004) identify three types of malicious software: Trojan
horses, viruses and worms. Definitions and characteristics of Trojan horses, viruses and
worms are identified as follows.

Schwartau (2000) defines a Trojan horse as follows: "In simple English, a Trojan Horse
is a software program that is inserted into a computer without you knowing it" (p.
201).Trojan horses provide attackers with a range of information contained inside the
infected computer. They may also create a 'back door' in to the infected system.
Anonymous (2003) provides a more succinct definition of a Trojan horse:

A Trojan is a program that claims to perform some desirable or necessary
function, and might even do so, but performs some function or functions that the
individual who runs the program would not expect and would not want (p. 352).
As established, a Trojan horse infects a computer without the user's knowledge, it then
performs some undesired function.

Cohen (1985) cited in Anonymous (2003) describes a computer virus as "a program that
replicates by 'infecting' other programs, so that they contain a (possibly evolved) copy
of the virus" (p. 321). Anonymous (2003) argues that computer viruses have no
18

destructive properties; however they often have malicious intent. This is supported by
Serif and Gilliam (2003) who state that "a virus is a set of instructions, often malicious,
that can spread from computer to computer by attaching itself to otherwise legitimate
programs" (p. 1). The defining characteristic of a virus is therefore its ability to
replicate, however, to do so it needs a host. Like a virus, the defining characteristic of a
worm is its ability to replicate. However, worms differ from viruses in that they are able
to do so by themselves, this defining characteristic of self replication distinguishes
worms from viruses. Table 1 provides a summarised cross section of the defining
characteristics of Trojan horses, viruses and worms.

Klander (1997) argues that Trojan horses are a sub type of computer viruses, however,
given the Trojan horses inability (by definition) to replicate itself, this differs from the
above definitions. It is not within the scope of this document to argue definitions;
instead, a plausible single definition is used, that which is stated above.

3.2. 7 Password Crackers
Password crackers are a tools employed by attackers which discovers passwords using a
variety of attacks, including brute force or dictionary attacks (Irakleous, Purnell,
Dowland, & Papadaki, 2002; Gollmann, 1999; Klander, 1997). Gollmann (1999)
elucidates that in a dictionary attack the attacker matches all words in the dictionary to
the user's password. As the password is encrypted the attacker must first encrypt all
words in the dictionary using the same type of encryption as the password. Once the
words are encrypted they may be matched directly to the password, once a match is
found the password is known. It should be noted that this technique does not require the
password file to be decrypted, as each word, once encrypted is unique; the attacker need
only match the encrypted states.
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The second attack discussed in this section is the brute force attack. Brute force attacks
attempt to discover the password by trying combinations of letters in sequential order.
Klander (1997) states that "the bruteforceattackprogram will try passwords such as aa,
ab, ac and so on until it has tried every legal character combination. The hacker will
eventually get the password" (p. 430). An attacker using this technique will eventually
discover the password, how long this takes depends on the length of the password.
Adapted from Wakefield (2004), the following table represents the time necessary to
crack a password.

1

36

6 minutes

0.000036 seconds

2

1, 300

4hours

0. 0013 0 seconds

3

47,000

6 days

0.04 seconds

4

1, 700,000

6 months

2 seconds

5

60,000,000

20 years

60 seconds

10

3, 700,000,000,000,000

> 999 million years

118 years

•

Characters include the letters A to Z and number 0 to 9

•

Human discovery assumes one try every ten seconds

•

Computer discovery assumes one million tries per second.

Table 2 shows that the longer a password is the harder it is to crack, if a long password
is chosen and changed regularly then in the time it takes the attacker to discover the
password it has been changed. While this section covers some main threats to computer
security, the following section explores the mechanisms and processes that may be
employed to mitigate or prevent such threats.
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3.3 Computer Security
There is no definitive definition of computer security. Gollmann (1999) defines
computer security as follows: "Computer security deals with the techniques used to
maintain security within a computer system" (p. 3). Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2003)
support this; they assert "the purpose of computer security is to devise ways to prevent
the wealmesses [of computers] from being exploited" (p. 9). Technical and end-user
based computer security measures are discussed. The first section presents technical
countermeasures, including, firewalls, antivirus scanners, spyware scanners and
passwords. Following this computer security policies outlining acceptable practice for
computer users are presented.

3.3.1 Technical Countermeasures

The following is an account of some predominant technical countermeasures which may
be employed by users to create a more secure system. These are: firewalls, antivirus
software, anti-spyware and passwords. These countermeasures represent the most
common and most appropriate tools for the purposes of this investigation, which is
aimed at the computer user with a minimum amount of computer literacy.

3.3.1.1 Firewalls

Firewalls fall under several different headings; this section focuses on the general
definition and workings of firewalls. Bishop (2003) defines a firewall as "a host that
mediates access to a network, allowing and disallowing certain types of access on the
basis of a configured security policy" (p. 780). A firewall controls access between two
networks (Klander, 1997), some firewalls accept or reject information based on Internet
protocol address and port and others assess the contents of the message and act
accordingly. If the necessary properties of the package do not meet the security
requirements of the firewall then it is not allowed past (blocked from the network), if
the conditions are met, the package is allowed through. Peltier (2004) describes
firewalls are the first line of defence in computer security (p. 177). A table provided by
Szor (2005, p. 589) highlights a large number of infamous worms that can be denied
access by the use of a firewall. This provides justification for the inclusion of firewalls
as a technical countermeasure.
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3.3.1.2 Antivirus and Antispyware Software

Anonymous (2003) describes antivirus software as the immune system of computer
(p. 1). Anonymous (2003) states that "because no anti-viral package (or combination of
packages) is a panacea for computer viruses, the key to escaping harm is prevention"
(p. 1). The author continues to explain that in order to ensure prevention anti-virus
software should be updated frequently, these updates provide protection from recently
created viruses. According to Swartz (2003) there was a 519% increase in computer
virus infected emails over a six month period in 2003 (p. 1). The threat posed by
viruses, worms and Trojan horses can be mitigated or prevented by employing an up-todate virus and antispyware scanner.
3.3.1.3 Passwords

Today, passwords are the most common form of user authentication to computer
systems (GoHman, 1999; Landwehr, 2001; Irakleous, Purnell, Dowland, & Papadaki,
2002). Irakleous, Purnell, Dowland, & Papadaki (2002) explain that "despite their
popularity, however, these methods are typically characterised as providing weak
authentication, due mainly to vulnerabilities introduced by end users" (p. 1). Klein
(1990) and Kessler (1996), cited in Irakleous, Purnell, Dowland, & Papadaki (2002) list
these vulnerabilities as follows: badly selected (and therefore easily guessed or
cracked), forgotten, written down, shared with colleagues, infrequently changed and
kept the same across multiple systems" (p. 100). The following elaborates on these
vulnerabilities.

Badly selected passwords which may be easily guessed or cracked (Section 3.2.7) are
passwords that are either short (less than six characters) or are common English phrases.
As previously discussed attackers may use password crackers to easily discover these
passwords. In addition, if a password is a common English phrase it may be easily
guessed, for example 'cat'. As explained in section 3.2.7 the longer a password is, the
-

harder it is to crack. However, by the same token, the longer a password the harder it is
to remember. Wakefield (2004) elucidates that the fact passwords must be remembered
and frequently changed means that quite often they are written down (p. 1). Sharing
passwords with colleagues is a direct contradiction to the purpose of a password, which
is to authenticate a person, proving they are who they say they are.
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Wakefield (2004) provides a list explaining the properties of strong passwords, she
states that "strong passwords integrate all of the following features:
•

At least eight characters in length

•

A combination ofletters of mixed case, and numbers

•

Easily typed

•

Something known only to the user (i.e., not present in any database)

•

Not found in an English or foreign language dictionary

•

Never shared

•

Never written down" (p. 1).

Wakefield's (2003) list provides guidelines to ensure passwords are as secure as
possible. However, Gollmann (1999) explains that passwords do not provide definitive
authentication for a person, authentication (using passwords) only implies that the user
knows the password (p. 28). Gollmann (1999) states, "there is no way of telling the ·
difference between the legitimate user and as intruder who has obtained that user's
password" (p. 28). This point, combined with the fact that passwords are currently the
most common form of authentication (Irakleous, Purnell, Dowland, & Papadaki, 2002,
p. 101), means that all measures should be taken to ensure passwords are as strong as
possible.

The above presents the relevant technical countermeasures that should be employed to
achieve effective computer security. However, of upmost importance is the manner in
which user behave and make use of these tools.

3.3.2 Acceptable Practice
Acceptable practice refers to the computer security practices that are acceptable for
users in a ·particular context, for example, at work or at home. Cyber-Ark (2005), cited
in the Computer Crime Research Center (2005), states that in a successful information
security program, all three pillars-people, process, and technology must be strong. The
previous section deals with technology, this section covers the people and process
pillars. Anonymous (2003) defines acceptable use as" ... a general set of guidelines for
administrators and users that emphasizes best practices and security awareness in daily
work" (p. 637). This .section will outline what should be practiced by users in order to
take maximum advantage of the technical mechanisms described above and to
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successfully mitigate the threats that are not controllable by the technical
countermeasures. It is important in this section to establish a clear line on what users
should be taught and what can be expected ofthem. AusCERT (2004) explains "Users
of Internet banking and ecommerce services should ensure that the machine, through
which they access the web, can be trusted and is well secured" (p. 25). In addition to
employing each of the technical countermeasures discussed above, users should
consider the following.

As described in section 3.2.2.3 social engineering attacks are aimed at users who are not
aware of such scams, these emails trick people into revealing personal information
because they think it is the right thing to do. Spencer (2005) states "Internet users
should ignore emails asking for personal or financial information and take note of popup warnings". Users should be aware that banks and other financial institutions will not
requestion login information via email or phone call.

Erbschloe (2005) describes in detail what users should and shouldn't do in relation to
being responsible for computer security. This list (adapted from Erbschloe, 2005),
defines important aspects in acceptable practice for end-users:

Things not to do:
Disable or interfere with antivirus software on your computer,
Open emails from unknown sources,
Open email attachments unless you know whom they are from,
Share access to your computer with strangers,
Let web sites you visit install software on your computer.

Things to do:
Use hard to guess password,
Change passwords often, and,
Be cautious when downloading files from the Internet (p. 149).

Hanna (2005) emphasises that users should adopt secure passwords, he maintains that
"bad and poorly guarded passwords are the bane of most systems" (p. 1). In addition to
not letting web sites install software on the computer, users should also be aware of the
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Internet sites they visit. Cyber-Ark (2005), cited in the Computer Crime and Research
Center (2005), states:
Employees should be well versed in the risks of spyware and downloading
unauthorised applications from the Internet and opening attachments; and they
should be on guard for social-engineering techniques designed to pilfer
usemames and passwords from unsuspecting users (p. 1).
This demonstrates that users should be aware of the risks involved in downloading
unauthorised applications and email attachments. They should also look for social
engineering techniques. In order to identify for something its features must first be
known, thus highlighting once more, the need for end-user education.

Acceptable practice and what a user should and shouldn't do are of core importance to
this investigation. The above establishes what countermeasures end-users should use
and how they should behave. To sufficiently convey this information to the end-user,
effective teaching techniques must be employed. The following section discusses
learning theories and teaching theories, identifying how adults learn and how they
should be taught.
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3.4 Education
This investigation aims to provide educational material to adults on topics concerning
computer security. Therefore, the educational value of the package is critical to the
substance of the investigation.

3.4.1 Constructivism and Behaviour Modelling

Today, the learning theories that hold the most sway are those based on constructivist
principals (Oliver & Herrington, 2003, p. 12). Lebow (1993) and Jonassen and Reeves
(1996), cited in Oliver and Herrington (2003), state, in relation to constructivist
learning, "learning is based as the construction of meaning rather than as the
memorisation of facts" (p. 12). Cunningham, Duffy and Knuth (1993), cited in Oliver
and Herrington (2003) present seven pedagogical goals that characterise a constructivist
learning environment, they suggest that constructivist learning settings are those which
concurrently:

provide experience in the knowledge construction process;
provide experience in and appreciation for, multiple perspectives;
embed learning in realistic and relevant contexts;
encourage ownership and voice in the learning process;
embed learning in social experience;
encourage the use of multiple modes of representation; and
encourage self-awareness in the knowledge construction process. (p. 12)
This indicates that a successful constructivist learning environment is one that
establishes a need or desire within the learner to seek knowledge on the topic. Once this
has been achieved the teacher simply facilitates the acquisition ofknowledge, providing
the learner with the necessary skills to acquire it. Simon (2000) conducted a study
involving four hundred and fifty members of the U.S Navy and three training methods:
instruction, exploration and behaviour modelling. The study aimed to assess "the
relationship of learning style and training method to End-User computer satisfaction and
computer use" (p.l). The study found that "behaviour modelling trainees were not
influenced by learning style and these trainees had the highest level of satisfaction and
computer use" (p.1 ).

In addition to behaviourism and constructivism, Malcolm Knowles' theory of adult

learning provides a framework for the content and development of the package
(Knowles, 1984).
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3.4.2 Adult education

Knowles' Theory of Andragogy (as opposed to the Theory of Pedagogy) explains the
mechanisms and motives in adult learning. Knowles (1984) presents a section
concerning how adults learn in computing; this is especially relevant in the context of
the investigation and is expanded upon. Knowles (1984, p. 174) identifies four key
points in relation to adult learning and the computer industry. These are summarised as
follows:

1. "Adults have a deep need to know why they need to know something before
they invest time and energy in learning it."
2. ''Adults are task oriented in their learning. We learn those things best which
we learn in the context of using them to do what we want to do."
3. "Give us choices that will enable us to tie into the use of the computer from
different experiential basis."
4. "Adults have a deep psychological need to be self directing ... "

The first point indicates that the effectiveness of any educational content is directly
related to whether or not the individual has a pre-existing desire to learn the content.
This point indicates that forcing an adult to engage in an education situation and
assessing their conformity to the information provided will yield poor results. Lindeman
(cited in Knowles, 1984) supports this conclusion, he states "Facts and information
from the different spheres are used, not for the purpose of accumulation but because of a
need in solving problems ... Adults are motivated to learn as they experience needs and
interests that learning will satisfy ... " (p. 30). Combined with the discussion on
constructivist leaning in section 3.4.1, this translates into the fact that the package will
have a greater effect on individuals with an existing desire to learn about computer
security. The need for computer security must, therefore, be established early in the
package.
The second point presented by Knowles (1984) suggests adults learn best when the
information presented, is done so in the context of where it would normally be used. For
example, teaching an adult how to browse the Internet is best done from in front a
computer with an Internet browser running. This allows ·the individual to place in
context .immediately the information presented. Lindeman, cited in Knowles (1984),
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maintains "adults' orientation to leaming is life-centred; therefore, the appropriate units
for organising adults leaming are life situations, not subjects" (p. 31). Adults leam best
in real life situations and situations that directly affect the life of the individual. Placed
in the context of this investigation, this means the individual should be actively using
computers and the Intemet.

The third point states that adults should be presented with the ability to relate what they
are leaming to other experiences. Lindeman, cited in Knowles (1984), illustrates that
"experience is the richest resource for adults' leaming; therefore, the core methodology
of adults' education is the analysis of experience" (p. 31). Analogies allow people to
relate topics and information to real life experiences. Giving people the ability to relate
new information to what they already understand makes it easier for them assimilate it,
thus, increasing the effectiveness of the leaming process.

Finally, Knowles (1984) states that adults need to be self directing in life. Knowles .
(1984) explains that, as adults "we resent being talked down to, having decisions
imposed on us, controlled, directed, and otherwise treated like children" (p. 175).
Expanding on this point, Knowles (1990) states "therefore, the role of a teacher is to
engage in a process of mutual enquiry with them rather than to transmit his or her
knowledge to them and evaluate their conformity to it" (p. 31). The fact that adults like
to be self directing must be taken into careful consideration in reference to teaching and
developing an effective learning package. The structure of the session should be
flexible, allowing the Ieamer to control, to some extent, its direction. Lindeman (cited in
Knowles, 1984, p. 31) explains how differences between people increase with age,
therefore, to successfully teach adults style, time, place and pace of leaming should be
taken into careful consideration.

3.5 Signif!cance
This literature review establishes users as the weak link in computer security. In
addition it presents a justifiable need for an educational package designed to inform
users of the risks ofunsafe computing and ways in which computing can be made safer.
Discussed in section 3.4 were the education theories of constructivism, behaviour
modelling and Andragogy. Providing a basis for the structure and content of the
educational package, these theories are employed to ensure· the package is as effective
as possible.
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4.0 METHODOLOGY
Punch (1998) and Leedy and Onnrod (2005) present research methodologies under two
headings, quantitative and qualitative. The differences between quantitative and
qualitative data and their applicability to this investigation are explored. Following an
outline of considered approaches, the section concludes with a detailed description of
the explanatory approach to mixed methods research as defined by Cresswell (2005),
and why it was selected for this investigation.

4.1 Comparing Quantitative and Qualitative Data

Thomas (2003) distinguishes between quantitative and qualitative research, he states:
" ... qualitative methods involve a researcher describing kinds of characteristics
of people and events without comparing events in terms of measurements or
amounts. Quantitative methods, on the other hand, focus attention on
measurements and amounts (more and less, larger and smaller, often and
seldom, similar and different) of the characteristics displayed by the people and _
events that the researcher studies" (p. 1).
Leedy and Onnrod (2005) expand on this explanation in presenting the following
general uses for each approach: "Quantitative research is used to answer questions about
relationships among measured variables with the purpose of explaining, explaining,
predicting, and controlling the phenomena (p. 94). The authors explain that quantitative
research is also known as traditional, experimental, positivist approaches (p. 94). They
continue to explain that, "in contrast, qualitative research is typically used to answer
questions about the complex nature of phenomena, often with the purpose of describing
and understanding the phenomena from the participants' point of view" (Leedy and
Onnrod, 2005, p. 94). This approach is also referred to as interpretive, constructivist, or
postpositivist approaches (Leedy and Onnrod, 2005, p. 94).

Quantitative research deals with measurable factors which can be interpreted into
numbers and statistics. The purpose of quantitative research is to explain and predict,
confirm and validate, and test theory (Leedy and Onnrod, 2005, p. 94). This approach
deals with numeric data, collected in large samples that are quantified in some way.
Punch (1998) supports this in stating, "quantitative research involves measurements,
usually or a number of variables, and usually across a sample" (p. 113). To determine
the meaning of the data statistical analysis and deductive reasoning are applied with a
stress on objectivity. An example of a quantitative study may be determining the
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percentage of people who smoke and who also have cancer, this would involve a large
population, and purely statistical data. In this investigation quantitative data are used to
represent population demographics, perceived awareness and participant behaviour.

Leedy and Ormrod (2005, p. 133) explain that qualitative research deals with factors
such as people's views or opinions and that the approach is used to gain a better
understanding of complex situations. Punch (1998) supports this, he states, "qualitative
research concentrates on the study of social life in natural settings" (p. 199). Qualitative
studies aim to describe and explain, explore and interpret, and build theories that may be
used as grounding for future studies. Leedy and Ormrod (2005) emphasise that it is
important to recognise that the analysis is potentially biased and subjective (p. 96). Data
from qualitative studies are communicated by words, narratives and person voice. In the
context of this investigation, determining traits in qualitative data provides the
opportunity to gain an insight into the reasons why people may not engage in safe
computing, their opinions of the package and their willingness to change behaviour.

From this examination it is concluded that this investigation could benefit from both
quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data will be used to determine population
demographics, user awareness and if behaviour change occurs. Qualitative data will
provide insight into the motives behind quantitative results.

4.2 Outline of Available Research Designs
This section provides a discussion on the mixed methods research designs considered
for this investigation. Their suitability and the reasons for their exclusion or inclusion
are provided. Creswell (2005) asserts, "you use mixed methods when you want to
incorporate a qualitative component into an otherwise quantitative study" (p. 510). As
presented in section 4.1 the investigation houses aspects that provide justifiable use for
both qua.tltitative and qualitative data. Thomas (2003) avows "the best answer
frequently results from using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods" (p.
7). Creswell (2003, 2005) advocates three approaches to mixed methods research, these
are: triangulation, exploratory and explanatory. The following section describes each
design regarding their advantages and disadvantages and their applicability to the
investigation.
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4.2.1 Triangulation Design
Triangulation in mixed methods research, as defined by Creswell (2005), "consists of
simultaneously collecting both quantitative and qualitative data, merging the data, and
using the results to best understand a research problem" (p. 600). Consider the
following diagram:

QUANTITATNE
Data I Results

QUALITATNE

+
Data I Results

Interpretation
Legend:
Box = Data collection and results
Uppercase/lowercase letters = Major emphasis/minor emphasis
Arrow = Sequence
Filmre 1 Triangulation mixed methods design (adanted from Creswell. 2005. n. 514)

As Figure 1 demonstrates, equal priority is given to both types of data, and the data is
collected simultaneously. After data has been collected, "the mixed methods researcher
compares the results from quantitative and qualitative analyses to determine if the two
databases yield similar or dissimilar results" (Creswell, 2005, p. 514). Creswell (2005)
explains the strength of this design is that it combines the advantages of both
quantitative and qualitative data (p. 515). The author maintains quantitative data
provides generalisability and qualitative data provides information on setting and
context (p. 515). Creswell (2003) highlights that collecting data concurrently means a
shorter collection time, however, he also presents a number of weaknesses (p. 217).
Creswell (2003, 2005) explicates that comparing data of two different forms can be a
difficult task; resolving discrepancies can also be difficult and may involve further data
collection (p. 217, 515). Strauss and Corbin, cited in Thomas (2003), argue that both
qualitative and quantitative methods can be used effectively in the same investigation.
However, most projects and researchers place their emphasis on one form over the
other. This is partly out of conviction, but also because of training and the nature of the
problem studied (p. 7). This investigation aims to assess behaviour and knowledge
change with quantitative data, using qualitative data to show possible reasons behind the
quantitative results. It is therefore postulated that more priority should be place on
quantitative data.
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4.2.2 Exploratory Design
Exploratory mixed methods research aims to explore a phenomenon using qualitative
data, then, using quantitative data, explain the relationships found in the qualitative data
(Creswell, 2005, p. 516). The following diagram presents an overview of the structure
of exploratory mixed methods research.

QUALITATIVE
Data I Results

...
Follow-up

quantitative
Data I Results

Legend:
Box = Data collection and results
Uppercase/lowercase letters= Major emphasis/minor emphasis
Arrow = Sequence

Figure 2 Exploratory mixed methods design (adapted from Creswell, 2005, p. 514)

As Figure 2 outlines that emphasis is given to qualitative data, which is collected before
quantitative data in a sequential fashion. Creswell (2005) describes the purpose of the
quantitative data to build upon, or explain the initial qualitative findings (p. 516). The
above design represents a possible framework for this investigation. However, it was
concluded that, due to the nature of the study, emphasis should be given to participants'
behaviour, and responses from participants can be used to explain results. Therefore,
emphasis should be placed on quantitative (behavioural) data, which is collected
initially, followed by qualitative (responses) data to explain the initial results. Section
4.2.3 explains the explanatory approach to mixed method research (as defined by
Creswell, 2005) which aligns to the above requirements.
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4.2.3 Adopted Approach -Explanatory Design
Research was conducted using an explanatory approach to mixed methods research as
defined by Creswell (2005). Consider the Figure 3 as an overview of the explanatory
approach to mixed methods research.

QUANTITATIVE
...

Data I Results

Follow-up

qualitative
Data I Results

Legend:
Box = Data collection and results
Uppercase/lowercase letters= Major emphasis/minor emphasis
Arrow = Sequence

Figure 3 Explanatory mixed methods design (adapted from Creswell, 2005, p. 514)

As Figure 3 shows, results from the qualitative data will be used to strengthen the initial .
quantitative data. Figure 3 also demonstrates that more emphasis will be placed on
quantitative data. As Creswell (2005) asserts, "the purpose of the sequential explanatory
design typically is to use qualitative results to assist in explaining and interpreting the
findings of a primarily quantitative study'' (p. 215). Morse (1991) cited in Creswell
(2005) states that "it can be especially useful when unexpected results rise from a
quantitative study'' (p. 215). If unexpected results arise, the qualitative data gathered
will be used to give insight into why the unexpected results have arisen. In the
explanatory approach more emphasis is given to quantitative data, and, as the name
suggests, the qualitative data may be used to explain the quantitative data, thus giving
more detail to the investigation. Qualitative data are examined for common traits, once
identified these traits will be recorded along with their frequency.

At the centre of this investigation is people's behaviour; therefore, more emphasis must
be placed on quantitative data. One aim of this is investigation is to provide grounding
for future study into the education of end users (see section 8.0). Creswell (2005) asserts
that mixed method research may be conducted when building from one phase of
research to the other. Given the multiple phase topology of the investigation this
represents clear justification of adopting the explanatory approach choice.
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4.3 Research Data
This design was selected as it provides the opportunity to use both quantitative and
qualitative data; accordingly, this investigation collects both types. The participants'
behaviour, awareness and demographical information are represented as quantitative
data. This may be used to explore relationships such as perceived computer security
awareness before and after the presentation (data that are easily quantifiable).
Qualitative data will provide insight into quantitative results, where applicable. In
addition, qualitative data will be used to represent the perceived effectiveness of the
package by supplying data such as what parts the participants liked and what parts they
felt could have been improved. Priority is placed on quantitative data in alignment with
the explanatory approach to mixed methods research, as defined by Creswell (2005).
This means that more emphasis will be placed on quantitative results in the analysis and
investigation conclusions. Data concerning participant's demographics and behaviour
will be collected using quantitatively based questionnaires prior to obtaining their
qualitative responses from open ended questions in a final questionnaire.

Table 3 Quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and types of data (Adapted from

Method of data

Data type

Method of data

Data type

collection

collection

Open-ended

Text data

Closed-ended

questions on

transcribed from

questions

questionnaires

questionnaires

Questionnaires;

Numeric scores

Table 3 shows quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection and types of data
that are collected in this investigation. As defined by Creswell (2005), quantitative data
will be analysed and the results will be explained in more depth in the qualitative phase
of the investigation (p. 521). The research data is presented and results are analysed in
the following sections: user awareness and user behaviour. Quantitative data will be
analysed under these sections establishing a discussion. Qualitative data will be
analysed, and traits will be identified in each question. These traits will be presented
under each relevant question in the results section. The traits identified in each question
will be employed to explain possible reasons or motives for the results shown in the
quantitative data.
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5.0 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The design and implementation of this investigation is described under six sequential
headings: the educational package, gathering the participant population, the pre-package
questionnaire, delivery of the package, the initial post package questionnaire, the two
week post-presentation questionnaire and the final qualitative questionnaire. Aligning
with the project methodology, data for the investigation is gathered using four
questionnaires: three with a quantitative focus and the final questionnaire that addresses
qualitative issues.

5.1 Developing the Educational Package
This section describes the processes taken in developing the package, the justification
for its structure and reasons for inclusion/exclusion of information. The educational
package was a structured as a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation; however, it also
includes interactive features. A primary concern in developing and delivering the
presentation was that participants viewed it more as a discussion; therefore it is referred ·
to as an educational package.

As discussed in the literature review, cracking, identity theft, fraud, social engineering,
denial of service attacks, malicious software and password crackers are responsible for
countless computer crimes, stolen identities and the loss of billions of dollars. These
topics represent the main threats that may be mitigated by educating users, that is, they
are events that the computer user has some control over. The discussion of such threats
is irrelevant if users are not presented with the knowledge required to mitigate or
prevent them. The presentation is structured using analogies wherever deemed
necessary. As discussed in section 3.4.2 of the literature review, analogies help people
tie unfamiliar concepts into a familiar context, thus making it easier to understand. The
following headings represent sections in the presentation (see Appendix A); under each
heading is. a description of what it contains and how it was explained to the participants.
For the purposes of readability sections within the presentation are referred to as 'parts'.

5.1.1 Package Introduction and Background
The final product (see appendix A), is organised into a logical progression of topics,
explaining each relevant threat followed by how to prevent or mitigate it. Initially the
background of the educational package is discussed (parts 1 and 2 of the presentation).
Numerous threats to computer security mean that any sensitive information stored on an
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unsafe computer which is connected to the Internet is accessible to attackers. This
section in the presentation provides the participant(s) with justification for learning the
content of the package. As discussed in section 3.4 of the literature review adults have a
need to know, why they need to know something before they invest time and energy in
learning it. This initial justification for learning aligns with this and it is proposed that
starting the presentation with this background creates desire to learn about computer
security. This initial section is designed also, to explain to the participants the difference
between the package and other sources of information. "This presentation is different
because it will empower you with knowledge of computer security issues"; rather than
simply stating what should and shouldn't be done, participants are shown why this is so.

5.1.2 Cracking, Intemet Protocol Addresses and Ports

Part 3 of the presentation explains Internet Protocol addresses, ports and cracking.
Participants are educated on the fact 'that attackers use IP addresses and ports to gain
access to computers. This is explained as follows:
If an attacker wanted to break into your house he or she would first have to know the
address of your house, the attacker would then look for open windows or doors. The
same may be applied to computers, if an attacker wants to break into a computer their
must first discover they IP address of the computer, they would then look for open ports
to gain entry though. This means that your IP address can be thought of as the address
of your house and ports can be thought of as doors and windows; open ports are like
open windows and doors, closed ports are like locked windows and doors.

5.1.3 Firewalls

As discussed in theJiterature review (Section 3.3.1.1), firewalls mediate and control
access between computer systems. Part 4 of the presentation, as a follow up to the
previous section describes firewalls. What firewalls are, how they work and how to use
them effectively is presented to participants. Slide number six (Section 4.1) provides a
simple diagram demonstrating that a firewall is situated between the computer and the
Internet. Presented in slides eight, nine and ten is an explanation of the workings of a
firewall and a screen shot of Kerio Personal Firewall 42 running. The connections and
symbols shown in the screenshot are described to the participant(s). Firewalls are
described using the previous analogy of a person's house: Running a firewall is like
having a bouncer at the doors and windows of your

house~

when an unknown person
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requests entry to the house the bouncer checks what they look like and their intentions.
In addition, when person leaves the house the bouncer makes sure they have not taken
anything with them. The same applies for a firewall, information entering and leaving
the computer system is checked against a specific set of rules; if all requirements are
met, the information is allowed through.

5.1.4 Malicious Software

As developed in the literature review, (Section 3.2.2.5), the presentation divides
malicious software into three sub categories: viruses, worms and Trojan horses. Part 5
of the presentation explains the difference between the three types of malicious software
to the participant, highlighting the defining characteristics of each. Viruses, in
accordance with the biological definition, need a host in order to survive. They attach to
other programs without knowledge or consent and are commonly downloaded from
email attachments or applications on the Internet. The defining characteristic of viruses
is replication, although, they need a host to do so. Worms, like viruses, have the .
defining characteristic of replication, the difference however, is that worms are self
propagating. This means that they are able to travel across networks, including the
Internet, by themselves. They are responsible for using bandwidth and denying services
to users. The term Trojan horse refers to a program inserted into your computer without
you knowing it. Once inside the Trojan horse performs some undesired function such as
logging key strokes. Following the explanation of a Trojan horse an interactive Trojan
horse demonstration is conducted. Desktop Scout 4.0 3 and two laptops are utilised to
perform the functionality of a Trojan horse. One laptop is infected with the Trojan horse
(the victim's computer) and one with the Trojan horse control software (the attacker's
computer). The participant is given the opportunity to perform functions such as remote
desktop control, directory browsing and file transfer. As part of the interactive session
one participant creates a text file on the infected computer with a secret message in it.
Another

p~rticipant

is shown, from the attacker's computer, how to transfer the secret

file from the victim's computer and read the message. This interactive demonstration
concludes the malicious software section of the package; the following section provides
participants with the necessary knowledge to mitigate or prevent the threat of malicious
software.
5.1.5 Antivirus Software and Spyware Scanners

2
3

Kerio Personal Firew~n4:o- Available www.kerio.com
Desktop Scout 4.0- Available www.globalpatrol.net
37

In order to keep a computer clean of the malicious software described above antivirus

and spyware scanners should be employed. Part 6 of the presentation provides a brief
overview of some available antivirus software and spyware scanners; it also explains
that scans should be completed once per week at least. As discussed in the literature
review (Section 3.3.1.2) keeping antivirus software and spyware scanners up-to-date is
of upmost importance, these tools can only stop malicious software they know about;
new viruses, worms and Trojan horses are being created every day.

5.1. 6 Passwords and Password Crackers

The literature review (Section 3.3.1.3) establishes that passwords are the main form of
authentication used today. It is assumed that every participant has at least one password
they use frequently. Part 7 of the presentation explains that passwords should not be
written down or told to other people, in addition to this, strong passwords should be
chosen. The characteristics of a strong password is that it is eight characters or more in
length, contains alpha-numeric (numbers and letters) characters and has no distinct
meaning in the English language. This part of the presentation presents examples of
strong and weak passwords and highlights that there is an obvious trade off between
how easy the password is to remember and how strong it is. The justification for having
a strong password is now explained to participants. Password crackers (Part 8.0) are
tools used by attackers to discover passwords; they use two main techniques, brute force
attacks and word lists. Brute force attacks try all combinations of letters and numbers in
order until the password is discovered, the longer the password the time it takes to
discover increases exponentially (see Table 2). Word lists match phrases and words to
the password until it is discovered, if a password has no logical meaning, or contains
numbers then this attack will not work.

5.1. 7 Social Engineering and Miscellaneous Knowledge

The desigi1 and implementation of Parts 8 through to 11 is explained in this section. If
users do not log off computers when they are not using them in a situation where others
have physical access to the computer then all possible countermeasures are made
redundant. If a computer is left unattended and logged on, anyone, within reason, may
use that computer for whatever purposes. Information may be stolen or data may be
deleted or modified. All events will be logged under the name of the person who was
logged in and left the. computer unattended. The presentation also explains that it is
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important to disconnect from the Internet when not using it. If the computer is not
connected to any network then it is safe from electronic threats such as cracking or
malicious software. Social. engineering, as described in the literature review (Section
3.2.2.3), aims to trick users into disclosing information, most commonly account details.

Two of the most common forms of social engineering are fake emails and phone calls.
This section explains that banks and other institutions will not send emails requesting
account details, such emails are fraudulent. The term for this attack is Phising. Users, in
this section, are also instructed to frequently clear cookies and offline content and
shown how to do so.

This concludes the discourse related to the presentation. In what follows, section 5.2
discusses the procedure of gathering a sample population. Following this, the design and
implementation of initial questionnaire is presented. Sections 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 provide
the design and implantation of the three post-package questionnaires.

5.2 Gathering Participants
Participants were gathered from a variety of different backgrounds, representing a broad
range of estimated computer literacy. A total of twenty participants took part in the
investigation, subjects were selected based on their age, estimated computer literacy and
use of computers. By selecting participants with varying demographics a clearer
indication is given, ofwhat effect, in terms ofknowledge, awareness and behaviour, the
package has on users.

5.3 Pre-Package Questionnaire
The pre-package questionnaire is designed to collect initial quantitative information
describing the sample population's demographics, current computer security awareness
and current behaviour (see appendix B). The questionnaire begins with a generic letter
describing_ the purpose of the investigation, the participant's role and how data will be
handled. The cover letter informs the participant that all data is de-identified and
destroyed upon completion of the thesis. Any reference to individuals is through an
alpha numeric code. Page two contains a table outlining a list of available times for
prese~ting the package on various days from the 3rd of October to the 9t\ in addition a

section is allocated for other times. This timetable allows participants to select a number
of times that best suit them, from these possible times partiCipants can be grouped into
sessions with others o.f similar computer literacy (this is estimated from the participant's
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reported computer security awareness). The purpose of this is to make participants feel
as comfortable as possible. Also any questions asked may be applicable to others in the
group. Following the timetable participants are required to fill out contact details: name,
contact number, email.

Demographic information was then collected: age and estimated computer use (hours
per week). Following the demographical sections, sections outlining behavioural data
are presented: What the computer is used for, the number of hours per day the computer
is connected to the Internet, what activities are performed on the Internet, what
computer security countermeasures are running and up-to-date, and the participant's
estimated understanding of computer security issues.

The information collected from this questionnaire is quantitative, thus, aligning with
mixed methods explanatory research. The demo graphical and behavioural data provides
a foundation to cross-reference with further quantitative and qualitative data.

5.4 Presenting the Package
This section explains the manner in which the package was presented to participants.
The package was presented to small groups of between two and five participants,
structuring the presentation this way gives participants increased opportunity to ask
questions and discuss topics. As discussed in Section 3.4 of the literature review adults
"have a deep psychological need to be self directing" (Knowles, 1990, p. 31). Knowles
(1990) continues to explain that this means the role of the teacher is to engage in a
process of mutual enquiry with the learner, rather than convey his/her knowledge with
them and assess their conformity to it (p. 31). While bearing this in mind a line must be
drawn between allowing the participant to be self directing and presenting the
knowledge that is most important in a succinct and logical fashion. The sessions were
structured_to be interactive, allowing participants to ask as many questions as possible.
At the commencement of the presentation all participants were informed that they
should view the presentation as an open discussion, and that the structure of the
presentation is simply to aid their questions and present information in a logical order.
The advantage of this design is that participants feel free to ask questions and discuss
topics, if a question is raised that is covered in a later section then it can be covered
later, or if deemed important to the current context, discussed at present.
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Prior to the commencement of the package users were informed of the following. The
package is aimed at people with a minimum level of computer literacy; this means they
are not expected to know any of the content of the package. Participants are not
expected to understand everything the first time. Participants should feel free to ask
questions at any stage in the presentation. Participants should view the package as a
discussion between two adults, rather than a presentation.

After each topic was covered questions relating to the content were asked, this allowed
continuous assessment of the participants progress. It is proposed that this achieves two
goals. Firstly, this will give them a better understanding of the topic by putting it into
their own words, and secondly, it will ensure the presentation is not moving at a pace to
fast for the participant.

5.5 Initial Post-Presentation Questionnaire

Following the presentation of the package, participants filled out an initial questionnaire _
(see Appendix C). This questionnaire collects quantitative data on two variables. The
first is the participant's perceived change in their computer security awareness. The
second covers the participant's willingness to adopt a safer approach to computing.
Individuals are asked to list their estimated level of computer security awareness before
and after the presentation, this serves two purposes. Firstly this feedback was used to
assess whether or not the individual now views themselves as more aware of computer
security issues. Secondly their estimated level of computer security before the package
can be compared to that which they stated before viewing the package.

5.6 Quantitative Two Week Post-Presentation Questionnaire

This post-presentation questionnaire (see Appendix D) was given to the participants two
weeks after they received the package, it has two main purposes. Collecting quantitative
data, the questionnaire aims to assess how much knowledge the participants retained.
Further questions involve whether or not the inclined behaviour change stated in the
initial post-presentation questionnaire actually materialised. The questionnaire is split
into two sections, the first section contains multiple choice questions designed to assess
how much of the package content the participants remembered. The second section
assesses change in the use of computer security countermeasures. This is the most
important questionnaire as the quantitative data collected is· used to determine whether
or not behaviour change actually occurred within the population.
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5.7 Qualitative Post-Presentation Questionnaire
The questionnaire represents the qualitative phase of data collection. The questionnaire
is designed to gather data that provides an insight into the quantitative data previously
gathered. As described in the investigation methodology (Section 4.0) the purpose of
qualitative data is to explain and explore possible explanations for the quantitative
results. The questionnaire contains the following open-ended questions:

1. Explain your view of computer security before the package and, if you listed
your estimated computer security awareness as below 5 before the package
please describe:
a) Whether or not you sought information on computer security to become
more aware
b) If you didn't please explain you reasons for not doing so.
c) If you did please describe how easy it was to find and understand.

2. Explain, in your own words, your view ofthe package.

3. Explain if, and how the package changed your view of computer security.

4. How do you think this presentation could have been improved?

The aim of the first question is to gain an insight into what the participant's views were
regarding the availability of existing computer security packages, and how easy they are
to understand.

The second question is structured to gain a qualitative insight in the effectiveness of the
package as viewed by the participant. The qualitative data gathered from this question is
aimed at providing an indication of participants' views of the package. It is postulated
that responses to this question will provide insight into the package's effectiveness and
applicability to computer security.

Question 3 aims to collect qualitative data based on how the package changed the
participant's view of computer security. Should quantitative data collected in the
previous questionnaires show change in participant's behaviour, this data will attempt to
provide exact motives for the change.
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The final question provides feedback by participants into if and how the questionnaire
may be improved. Not only does this provide an insight into the weaknesses of the
package, it is especially helpful in restructuring the package for any future
investigations.

The final questionnaire represents the qualitative data collection phase of the
investigation, thus aligning to the explanatory approach to mixed method research. The
results are now presented in Section 6.
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6.0RESULTS
This section structures and presents the data gathered from the investigation as results
under the headings of quantitative and qualitative. Creswell (2005) defines mixed
methods research as "a procedure for collecting, analysing, and mixing both quantitative
and qualitative data in a single study to understand a research problem" (p. 51 0). As
discussed in the methodology section more emphasis is placed on quantitative data
which is presented first. It is the purpose of this section to present the results gathered in
uninterrupted form, results are interpreted, analysed and discussed in the following
section.

6.1 Quantitative Results
The following is a summary of the quantitative results gathered in the investigation. The
section commences with a broad indication of population demographics before
progressing into user awareness and behaviour change.

The demographics of participants (see Appendix F) are varied. Most respondents are
aged either between twenty and twenty five years or thirty five and fifty years old, these
age brackets make up twelve out of twenty participants. Another five participants were
below the age of nineteen. Sample population computer use covers all hourly brackets
evenly, apart from zero to two hours which was not recorded by participants. In terms of
participants' willingness to adopt a safer approach to computing, a dramatic response
was record. As shown in Figure 12 (see Appendix H) twenty participants in all areas but
two, indicated that they were more willing to change their behaviour after viewing the
presentation. In the behavioural traits 'using a more secure password' and 'using up-todate antivirus software', all but four

participat~ts

indicated they were willing to change

their behaviour.

Also shown in the quantitative results was that all participants used computers at home
and all had an Internet connection. Twelve out of twenty participants used Internet
banking and eight purchased products online. The most common Internet connection
time was zero to five hours per day. All participants recorded 100% in the knowledge
retainment test.
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6.1.1 Change in Estimated Awareness
Figure 4 represents the participants' estimated computer security awareness on a scale of
one to ten, where one is basic and ten is excellent. The initial line represents the
participants' estimated computer security awareness prior to viewing the package. The
second line represents their view on the same variable, after viewing the package. The
third line shows the participants' estimated computer security awareness after viewing
the package.
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Figure 4 Graph showing participants' estimated computer security awareness

Seventeen out of twenty participants reported an increase in awareness. On average,
participants' perceived computer security awareness increased by 3.65 points. The
maximum was an increase of nine, reported in one case. The minimum was no increase
at all reported in three cases. Participants with estimated computer security awareness'
of eight and above before viewing the package did not register a change in awareness.
In five cases the participants pre-package awareness decreased by one after viewing the
package, 1n one case it decreased by two, respondent fourteen indicated a decrease of
four.
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6.1.2 Change in Behaviour
Figure 5 is a representation of the behaviour change that occurred in participants after
viewing the package. The initial, lighter bar represents the number of participants that
responded 'True' to engaging in unsafe computing prior to the package. The second,
darker bar shows the number of participants, in total, that changed their behaviour in
this area after viewing the package. For example, the first sector refers to the use of
weak passwords. Fourteen participants responded 'True' initially, meaning they used an
insecure password prior to the package. After viewing the package nine participants
were recorded as making their password more secure.

Graph showing behaviour change in participants
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Figure 5 Graph showing behaviour change in participants

The above graph shows that a behaviour change was recorded in all sectors. The largest
change in terms of total respondents was recorded in sector four, disconnecting or
turning of the computer when not using the Internet. From an initial eighteen
respondents answering 'True' to not turning off or disconnecting the computer when not
using the Internet, nine claimed to have changed their behaviour. The largest change in
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terms of percentage was witnessed in sector five, where nine out of eleven respondents
stopped visiting erroneous web sites. Sectors two and three, opening emails from
suspicious and unknown senders and logging others onto their account, reported the
least change, with two participants in each sector changing their behaviour.

Figure 6 represents the change registered in participants' use of technical computer
security countermeasures after viewing the package. The initial bar indicates a positive
response (Yes) by participants when asked if they were making use of the technical
countermeasure in question prior to viewing the package. The second bar indicates the
number of participants who gave positive responses to the same question after viewing
the package.
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Figure 6 Graph showing the change in use of technical countermeasures

As demonstrated in Figure 6, the use of Firewalls increased by three participants after
viewing the package. The use of antivirus software by participants increased by two
participants, raising it to nineteen and antispyware use increased by four participants,
raising it from eleven, to fifteen people out of a possible twenty.
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7.2 Qualitative Results
The following traits were identified in the qualitative data gathered from the final
questionnaire (see Appendix E). The traits are described in relation to the question they
were identified in.

6.2.1 Question 1

The most common trait discovered in the responses to Question 1 was the admission of
laziness by respondents; this trait was recorded in seven responses to this question. The
second most common trait identified was the respondent indicating that they did not
know where to look for the information coupled with the fear of not being able to
understand it; reported in five responses. A third equally common trait was that of the
participant having another family member who was deemed responsible for keeping the
computer secure. Thus, the respondent indicated there was no need to learn about
computer security; this was identified in five responses. A fourth, less frequent trait, was
identified four times, the respondent did not realise how little they knew, and how .
important computer security is.

6.2.2 Question 2

The most common traits discovered in reply to Question 2 are as follows: The package
was very informative, the information was presented at a basic level which was very
easy to understand and the use of analogies made topics a lot easier to understand.
These traits were all recorded in fourteen responses. Recorded in ten responses to this
question was a trait highlighting that the package made the respondent realise how little
they actually knew about computer security. The third most common trait, identified in
six respondents, was that the explanation of the differences between viruses, Trojan
horses and worms was very interesting. Equalling this trait, with six responses, was that
respondents found the information on how passwords are cracked and why it is
important _to use a strong password very interesting. Identified in five responses to the
question was a trait identifying that the presenter was very well informed and very
willing to answer questions.

6.2.3 Question 3

Identified in sixteen responses to this question, was a trait identifying that participants
were not aware how important computer security was, and the effect it had on their
place of work. ·Nine ·responses indicated that the participant was not aware how
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important it is to use a secure password. Nine respondents also indicated that they
would be more aware when browsing the Internet and opening emails.

6.2.4 Question 4

The most common response to this question was . "nothing", recorded in thirteen
responses. The second most common response to this question was the inclusion of
more interactive sections and more analogies, recorded in ten responses. The third most
common response was that more diagrams should be included; this was recorded in
seven responses. Recorded in four responses to this question was that the writing should
be bigger and a hand out should hand been given at the end of the presentation.

This concludes the presentation of the relevant results. The following section analyses
and discusses the quantitative results gathered, and uses the qualitative traits identified
to investigate further possible motives.
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7.0 ANALYSIS
This section analyses the data presented in the results section (Section 6) and forms a
critical appraisal. As an overall aim of this investigation is to transform behaviour in
end-users by educating them, this section will explore the extent to which behaviour
changed as a result of the educational material provided. This analysis is presented
under the following sections: user awareness and user behaviour.

7.1 User Awareness
The data collected regarding participants' estimated computer security awareness are
represented in Figure 6. As discussed in section 3.1 of the literature review user lack of
user awareness is a current threat to computer security in many contexts. Ernst & Young
(2004) found "lack of employee awareness" as the top obstacle in achieving an effective
computer security solution. Wade (2004) states "All too often it is the people aspect that
breaks down" (p. 1). Ernst & Young (2004) who surveyed 1, 233 organisations from 51
countries and duly discovered that a "lack of employee awareness" was listed as the top obstacle in providing an effective computer security solution. Quantitative results
gathered in the investigation align with these findings of low levels of computer security
awareness among users. Fourteen out of a total of twenty participants, recorded an
estimated level of computer security awareness of five or below prior to viewing the
package.

Also identified in the literature review was that the most common difficulty for
organisations was reported as "changing user attitudes and behaviour (reported by 65
percent of respondents)" (AusCERT, 2004, p. 3). On average, an increase in estimated
awareness of three points (on a scale of one to ten) was recorded by participants. This
demonstrates that within the sample population of twenty participants, the average
perceived security awareness increased. Seventeen out of twenty people reported an
increase in awareness, the three participants who did not register a change each had
perceived computer security awareness' of eight or above prior to viewing the package.
It is speculated that the reason for this lack of change is that the content covered by the

package was already understood by these participants. As the package is aimed at users
with a low level of computer literacy it does not contain advanced topics that may
benefit these participants.
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As shown in the investigation results (Section 6.1.1), five participants recorded a one
point decrease in pre-package awareness after viewing the package. One respondent
reported a decrease of two, another reported a decrease of three and one respondent
reported a decrease of four. These decreases indicate that, within the population of
twenty participants, seven people reported a decrease in how aware they viewed
themselves as being before the package. As the scale on which participants rated
themselves is a perceived estimation, this change underlines that before the package
they were actually less aware than they thought they were. The qualitative traits
identified in section 7.1.1 show this, with four respondents indicating that they did not
realise how little they knew about computer security and how important it was. Section
7 .1.2 also saw the trait highlighting that users didn't realise how little they knew about
computer security appear in ten responses. These qualitative results provide an insight
into this finding of levels of awareness within the population. These end-users either
didn't realise how little they knew, or did not view the topic as important enough to
warrant increasing their own knowledge.

In conclusion, it was discovered that within the sample population, the majority of
participants had an admitted low level of computer security awareness. These findings
are supported by the literature review which established a current lack in overall
security awareness by users. It was speculated that one reason for this was that users did
not realise how unaware they were, and therefore, did not seek to increase their
awareness. After viewing the presentation seventeen respondents indicated that they felt
more aware, this awareness is of trivial importance if it does not materialise in
behaviour; the following section analyses whether or not this occurred.

7.2 User Behaviour

This section analyses the change in the behaviour recorded within the population.
Results

fo~

this section are displayed in Figure 5. As the main aim of the package was to

change users' behaviour, the results identified in this section will provide an insight into
the effectiveness of the package within the population. As stated in the document
background (Section 2), "the aim of education is to change behaviour" (Greer, 1997, p.
9). Section 3.4 in the literature review establishes a successful learning environment as
one that establishes a need or desire within the learner to seek knowledge on the topic. It
is speculated that the package achieved this goal by presenting the dangers of unsafe
computing and some {mssible scenarios that, in real life, would have a great effect of the
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participant. It is then stated, that once this has been achieved, the teacher facilitates the
acquisition of knowledge, providing the learner with the necessary skills to acquire
knowledge. The package does this by explaining the fundamentals of certain core
aspects of computer security. It also achieves this by allowing the participant to control,
to a certain extent, the direction of the package as it was being presented.

Demonstrated in Figure 5 is the claimed behaviour change for each individual in the
population. The following is a simplified representation of how many participants
claimed to have changed their behaviour.
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From Table 4, it can be seen that in every aspect of unsafe computing covered by the
investigation, a claimed behaviour change occurred. When compared with the initial
willingness of participants to change behaviour as stated in Section 6, Table 4 indicates
a large difference in participants' willingness and whether or not they actually changed
behaviour. In all of the above sectors, except sector one, all participants recorded that
they were more willing to change behaviour. Sector five reported the highest behaviour
change with half of the respondents who indicated they were willing, actually changing
their behaviour.

Changes m each section differed, out of fourteen respondents who stated they
previously used unsafe passwords, five claimed to have changed their behaviour and
employed a safer password. Section 7.2.3 provides one possible explanation for this
behaviour change, identifying a trait in qualitative responses indicating participants
were not aware how important having a secure password is. The following discusses the
change in use of computer security countermeasures.
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AusCERT (2005) found that "inadequate levels of security on home and other
computers used by clients, customers and staff' (p. 30) was listed by 26% of
respondents. The findings of this investigation were that more than half of the twenty
participants employed what was defined as acceptable tools in section 3.3 of the
literature review. The figures indicate the number of participants relevant to each
section. As shown in the following table, a claimed increase in use of computer security
tools occurred within the population.

These findings tend to align with two notions identified in the literature review. The ·
first is that user education will change the behaviour of end-users, thus establishing a
safer operating environment. The second notion supported, is that a constructivist
approach to teaching is an effective way to educate users. By establishing a need or
desire for behaviour change the inclination of the individual to seek knowledge is
increased.

In conclusion, the results obtained from the investigation seem to support the notion,

identified in the literature review, that the construction of a desire to learn is an effective
means by which to educate. Within the population, an increase in computer security
awareness was identified coupled with a claimed change in behaviour and
implementation of countermeasures.
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8.0 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS
The learning theories of constructivism, behavioural approaches and Andragogy were
taken into account in designing the educational package addressing computer security
issues. The package was presented to twenty participants, who were required to
complete questionnaires to determine their responses to the package. The investigation
adopted an explanatory mixed methods research approach, as defined by Creswell
(2005).

8.1 Research Question

The literature supported the notion that educating end-users results in a more secure
operating environment. The research question, "would the provision of an educational
package addressing computer security issues change end-users' behaviour and use and
implementation of computer security systems?" is explained as follows. By empowering
participants to accept greater responsibility in addition to seeking knowledge, the
package was successful in changing end-user's behaviour within the group studied. Use of computer security tools within the population was shown to increase as a result of the
package. A high percentage of participants adopted safer behaviour as a result of the
package. User education is not the only solution to increasing computer security,
however, if users are aware of the various threats to computer security and the ways in
which they can prevent, or mitigate, these threats, a more secure operating environment
will result.

8.2 Limitations

Although the research successfully addressed the research question, the following
limitations are recognised. Population size was limited to twenty participants who lived
in the Bunbury area. This limits the investigation, as the sample population represents a
small fraction of computer end-users, and prevents the application of statistical
algorithms to quantitative data thereby reducing generalisability.

8.3 Future Recommendations

The following recommendations are suggested as a result of this investigation. An
increased population size would provide increased integrity to the investigation and
greater representation of computer end-users. As suggested ~y respondents, the addition
of more interactivity. within the package is recommended. This also aligns with
Knowles' Theory of Andragogy and the Theory of constructivism. A wireless
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demonstration allowing interactive control of computer from a remote locating is
suggested, as this will show participants that a physical connection is not required for a
computer to be vulnerable. In addition, the provision of a longitudinal survey will allow
a single group of users to be followed and behavioural changes tracked.
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10.0 APPENDICES
10.1 Appendix A- Presentation
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10.2 Appendix B -Pre-Package Questionnaire
Sam Jones
11 Y alinda Drive

Gelorup, 6230
Ph.0427479496

Dear Sir/Madam,
I would like to invite you to take part in the enclosed survey and subsequent study. I am
enrolled as a full time honours student at Edith Cowan University in Bunbury. This
semester I am completing a thesis based on educating users in computer security issues.
Should you choose to take part in this study a one and a half hour session will be
conducted. The session will consist ofbetween two and five other individuals and will
outline security elements of computing. You will be taught how to make better use of
computer security countermeasures.
I appreciate that you are busy and your time is valuable, however, I hope that you are
able to find time to support me in my endeavours. I am happy to answer any questions
you may have, please feel free to contact me via phone or email.
All personal information gathered will be de-identified immediately and destroyed upon
the completion of research. Reference to individuals in any subsequent papers will be
achieved through a non-identifiable alpha-numeric code.
Yours sincerely

Sam Jones
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COMPUTER SECURITY INFORMATION PRESENTATION
PLEASE FILL OUT THE FORM BELOW DETAILING DEMOGRAPHIC AND AVAILABILITY
INFORMATION.
EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY- HONOURS RESEARCH
INFORMATION GATHERED FROM THIS PRESENTATION WILL BE USED TO INVESTIGATE THE
IMPACT OF EDUCATING COMPUTER USERS ON COMPUTER SECURITY ISSUES AND
COUNTERMEASURES.
CONTACT DETAILS

Sam Jones
Mobile: 0427479496
Home: 97959782
Email: sdjones@student.ecu.edu.au
Please select which time(s) most appropriately suit(s) you:
Monday 3ra Oct
07:00-08:30 D
15:00- 16:30 D
17:00- 18:30 D
19:00-20:30 D

Tuesday 4th Oct
9:00-10:30 D
11:00-12:30 D
13:00- 14:30 D
15:00- 16:30 D

Wednesday 5th Oct
07:00-08:30 D
15:00- 16:30 D
17:00-18:30 D
19:00- 20:30 D

Friday in Oct
07:00-8:30
09:00- 10:30
11:00-12:30
13:00- 14:30
15:00-16:30
17:00- 18:30

Sunday 9th Oct
07:00-8:30 D
09:00-10:30 D
11:00-12:30 D
13:00- 14:30 D
15:00- 16:30 D
17:00-18:30 D

Other

D
D
D
D
D
D

Thursday 6th Oct
07:00-8:30 D
09:00- 10:30 D
11:00- 12:30 D
13:00- 14:30 D
15:00- 16:30 D

QUESTIONNAIRE
NAME:
CONTACT NUMBER:
EMAIL:
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AGE:
0-20

0

20-25

0

26-35

0

36-50

0

50-100

0

ESTIMATED COMPUTER USE (HOURS PER WEEK)?

0-2

0

2-10

0

10-20

0

20-40

0

Over40

0

FOR WHAT DO YOU USE YOUR COMPUTER?

Home

0

Work

0

Gaming

0

Study

0

Internet

0

Other

0

- Please state

DO YOU USE THE INTERNET FOR?

Internet banking

0

Email

0

Flesearch

0

Purchasing products 0
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WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARE CURRENTLY INSTALLED, UP-TO-DATE AND RUNNING
ON YOUR HOME COMPUTER?

YES

No

UNSURE

Firewall

D

D

D

Antivirus software

D

D

D

Antispyware software

D

D

D

ESTIMATED UNDERSTANDING OF COMPUTER SECURITY ISSUES:

1

D

2

D

3

D

4

D

5

D

6

D

7

D

8

D

9

D

10

D

-Basic

-Excellent

THANKYOU FOR EXPRESSING INTEREST AND PARTICIPATING IN THIS PROJECT. PLEASE
CONTACT ME AND I WILL ARRANGE FOR COLLECTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE.
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10.3 Appendix C- Initial Post-Presentation Questionnaire
NAME:

POST PRESENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE

PLEASE SELECT YOUR ESTIMATED UNDERSTANDING OF COMPUTER SECURITY ISSUES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE PRESENTATION.

After

Before

1

D

D

2

D

3

D

3

D

4

D

4

D

5

D

5

D

6

D

6

D

7

D

7

D

8

D

8

D

9

D

9

D

10

D

10

D

1

D

2

-Basic

-Excellent

-Basic

-Excellent

WILL YOU NOW BE MORE INCLINED TO (PLEASE ANSWER YES OR NO)?

Use a more secure password?
Not open emails from suspicious senders?
Not visit erroneous websites?
Keep antivirus software up-to-date and scan regularly?
Use a firewall?
Not log other people into your account?
Tum your computer off or disconnect when you are not using the Internet?

Thankyou for your participation.
Sam Jones
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10.4 Appendix D- Two Week Post-Package Questionnaire
NAME:
PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING SECfiONS TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY.

ill the context of computer security your IP address is:
a)
b)
c)
d)

Your illtellectual Property address.
Your illtemet Protocol address.
Your illtemational Pass-code address.
Your illtemet Ping address.

Your IP address above is best described as:
a)
b)
c)
d)

The logical address of your computer on the illtemet.
An illtemet based authentication method.
The power of your computer.
The length of time you have been connected to the illtemet.

ill the context of computer security a firewall is:
a) A mechanism to control access to a computer system and block unwanted and
malicious data.
b) A covering blanket for your computer, it keeps your computer cool and protects
it from dust.
c) A physical wall around your computer that prevents it from being stolen.
d) The logical address of your computer on the Internet.
Please select the "strongest" password from the list below.
a)
b)
c)
d)

qi92mw252fe
cat
filament
hello34

Why is it important to have a strong password?
a)
b)
c)
d).

Because strong passwords are easier to remember.
Because strong passwords can be typed quickly.
Because you can tell people what it is.
Because strong passwords are harder to crack.
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Your bank or any other financial institution will send you emails asking to confirm your
login details?
a) Yes
b) No

PLEASE STATE TRUE OR FALSE TO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.

Prior to viewing the package I was using an insecure password.
If True. I have now changed it to be more secure.

Prior to viewing the package I was opening emails from suspicious senders and
unknown senders.
If True. I no longer open emails ifl am wary of the sender.

Prior to viewing the package I logged others onto my account.
If True. I no longer log others onto my account

Prior to viewing the package I did not disconnect or tum my computer off when not
using the Internet.
If True. I now disconnect or tum my computer off when using the Internet.

Prior to viewing the package I visited erroneous websites.
If True. I no longer visiting erroneous web sites.

I now use a firewall.

I now use up-to-date antivirus software and scan regularly.

I now use _up-to-date antispyware software and scan regularly.

Thankyou for your participation.
Sam Jones
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10.5 Appendix E - Final Qualitative Questionnaire
NAME:
PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING SECI'IONS TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY.

Explain your view of computer security before the package and, if you listed your
estimated computer security awareness as below 5 before the package please describe:
d) Whether or not you sought information on computer security to become more
aware
e) If you didn't please explain you reasons for not doing so.
f) If you did please describe how easy it was to find and understand.

Explain, in your own words, your view of the package.

Explain if and how the package changed your view of computer security.
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How do you think this presentation could have been improved?

Thankyou for your participation.
Sam Jones
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10.6 Appendix F - Population Demographics
Graph showing population age

2

1'3 0-19

111i120- 25

6

026-35
0 36-50
• 50- 100

Figure 7 Graph showing the sample population age

Figure 7 represents the ages of the sample population.

Population computer use (hours per week)

0

El 0-2 Hours
112- 10 Hours

o 10-20 Hours
o 20 - 40 Hours
11 Over 40 Hours

Figure 8 Graph showing computer use (hours per week) within the sample population

Figure 8 illustrates the amount of time participants spent using computers per week.
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10.7 Appendix G - Population Behaviour
Graph showing computer use (activities) among
participants
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Figure 9 Graph showing comput~r use (activities) within the sample population

Figure 9 shows the relevant activities that participants within the population used
computers for.

Graph showing Internet connection time
(hours per day)

m0-5 Hours
115- 10 Hours

11

o10- 20 Hours
o 24 Hours

Figure 10 Graph showing Internet use (hours per day)

Figure 9 shows the amount oftime that participants' computers spent connected to the
internet per day.
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Graph showing activities performed on the Internet
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Figure 11 Graph showing activities performed on the Internet

Figure 11 shows activities which participants performed on the internet.
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10.8 Appendix H - Population Willingness to Change Behaviour
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Figure 12 Graph showing the populations willingness to change behaviour after viewing the
package

Figure 12 shows how willing participants were to change their behaviour in each area
immediat~ly

after viewing the package.
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